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In health policy, magic bullet answers tend to have more appeal than incremental adjustments. Politicians faced with the daunting issues in healthcare are eager to embrace 
new ideas promoted by academics and think tanks. However, 
in implementation, intrinsic flaws in design, such as the 
difficulty of finding physicians willing to be at risk for the 
costs of care, tend to be ignored. Once launched, inconvenient 
data about cost savings and quality tend to be downplayed or 
ignored until intrinsic flaws become manifest,1 which would 
be the signal to embrace a new idea. Such is likely to be the 
fate of the latest fix-all from the United States: the Accountable 
Care Organizations (ACOs). 
This was one reason why I wrote my editorial2: to explain why 
it would be better to regulate fee-for-service (FFS) payment, 
the traditional way by which physicians have been paid, rather 
than attempting to introduce capitation in primary care and 
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) in inpatient care. Although 
Britton has pointed out that a regulating process is needed in 
all methods of payment,3 DRG and pay-for-performance (P4P) 
require more administrative capacity. This makes it difficult 
for most low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) where 
payment tends to be dichotomized into line-item budgets for 
the public sector and unregulated FFS for the private sector. 
Moreover, in the former, patients tend to be charged for 
services not covered (extra billing) and/or charged for services 
that are covered (balance billing).
To regulate FFS payment, medical procedures must first 
be classified and defined. Second, to conduct surveys of the 
volume of each item being currently delivered. Third, to assign 
relative weights to each item based on opinions of professional 
groups concerning the time and other resources needed. 
Fourth, for the public sector, to set fees based on the relative 
weight and volume of each item by allocating from the budget. 
For the private sector, the fees could initially be set several 
times higher than that of the public sector but using the same 
relative scale. Finally, to gradually decrease the difference in 
amount between the two sectors. Be doing so, the two sectors 
could eventually be integrated, which will lead not only to 
greater equity, but also to greater efficiency. Note that it would 
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be a futile exercise to conduct extensive cost studies because 
resources used, and therefore costs, differ considerably across 
settings. Moreover, half of health expenditures relate to labor 
costs but there is no consensus on the appropriate hourly 
income of physicians (or that of nurses and other staff) when 
compared with other workers. 
Britton states that the regulatory mechanism would be greatly 
strengthened by introducing electronic medical records 
(EMRs). I agree that EMR would improve the quality of care 
and electronic billing will increase efficiency. However, I 
would be very cautious of directly linking EMR with data used 
for claims purposes because it would make gaming easier. For 
example, based on computerized algorithms, there could be 
prompts on the screen for physicians to add diagnoses or to 
order laboratory and diagnostic tests, backed up by questions 
to be posed to patients with options for their response. In 
this way, billing could be padded, yet with all regulations 
complied, by the physician making a few clicks.
To respond categorically to the points raised by Koppel4: 
1.	Preventing doctors from working outside of the system: 
If only governments in LMIC could do so by paying 
them “adequate” wages! Even in high-income countries 
in Europe, higher level physicians are usually allowed 
to receive FFS payment when practicing in the private 
sector. 
2.	The repeated failure of setting reasonable cost rates in the 
United States: It is the United States which is the outlier 
among high-income countries. Other countries have 
succeeded, at least when compared with the United 
States, as evidenced by their lower medical expenditures.
3.	& 4. Medical device costs and new technology not driven 
down by competition: I had assumed that prices are 
uniformly regulated. In Japan, in the 2002 fee schedule 
revision, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) fees were 
reduced by 30%. One justification for doing so was that 
competition had driven down the purchasing price of a 
MRI (list prices are a fiction). In the 2006 revision, their 
fees were differentiated according to the imaging density: 
a higher fee for images taken by a MRI with more than 1.5 
Tesla, and a lower fee for those less.5 When purchasing a 
car, luxury cars are priced higher than compacts. When 
a model change is announced, the dealer will reduce the 
price of the old model. The same principle should apply 
when purchasing a MRI.
The staff of international agencies and authors of academic 
journals tend to be dominated by Americans and British, who 
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have imposed their paradigms in healthcare. My editorial was 
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